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Classifying the Patterns of Natural 
Arguments
Fabrizio Macagno and Douglas Walton
abstr act
The representation and classification of the structure of natural arguments has been 
one of the most important aspects of Aristotelian and medieval dialectical and 
rhetorical theories. This traditional approach is represented nowadays in models 
of argumentation schemes. The purpose of this article is to show how arguments 
are characterized by a complex combination of two levels of abstraction, namely, 
semantic relations and types of reasoning, and to provide an effective and com-
prehensive classification system for this matrix of semantic and quasilogical con-
nections. To this purpose, we propose a dichotomous criterion of classification, 
transcending both levels of abstraction and representing not what an argument is 
but how it is understood and interpreted. The schemes are grouped according to 
an end-means criterion, which is strictly bound to the ontological structure of the 
conclusion and the premises. On this view, a scheme can be selected according to 
the intended or reconstructed purpose of an argument and the possible strategies 
that can be used to achieve it.
Keywords: argumentation, classification, types of reasoning, interpretation, 
 textual analysis, pragmatics, argumentation schemes
Argumentation schemes have become an important topic in argumen-
tation theory. Schemes have been developed as stereotypical patterns of 
inference, abstract structures representing the material (semantic) relation 
and logical relation between the premises and a conclusion in an argu-
ment. They are based on a richer semantic system than the formal repre-
sentations used in logic, and for this reason they can mirror both necessary 
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and defeasible relations between concepts. They can be regarded as the 
modern  interpretation and reconsideration of the ancient loci, that is, max-
ims of inference (Walton, Reed, and Macagno 2008; Rigotti 2009). Thanks 
to their explanatory and analytical effectiveness the schemes have been 
applied to different fields, ranging from education to law and artificial 
intelligence.
Many authors in the last fifty years have proposed different sets and 
classifications of schemes, trying to provide exhaustive lists from which 
more generic categories grouping different types of argument patterns can 
be abstracted.1 By contrast, Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst 
(2004) have proposed a top-down approach, distinguishing three generic 
types of schemes, under which different subtypes can be classified. All these 
theories concerning argumentation schemes raise crucial problems con-
cerning the criteria used for the distinctions and abstractions made, which 
ultimately are mirrored in the fundamental issue of what the structure and 
nature of an argumentation scheme is. These apparently purely philosophi-
cal questions are becoming increasingly important for practical purposes. 
How can we teach, use, and implement the schemes if there is not a com-
monly accepted set of criteria for distinguishing between them?
The purpose of this article is to tackle the problem of classifying the 
schemes, starting from the analysis of their nature and structure. We iden-
tify the different components of natural patterns of arguments, paying 
particular attention to the quasilogical and the semantic levels. We draw 
on our description of natural arguments to show the shortcomings of the 
existing classifications and to propose a new model aimed at providing a 
dichotomous system based on the pragmatic purpose of an argument, con-
sidered as a move (speech act) in a dialogue.
classifying the schemes
Arguments are reasons given to support a conclusion that is potentially 
controversial or less acceptable or accepted than the premises (Aristotle, 
Topics 100a25–26; 104b1–18). They are based on endoxa, that is, commonly 
accepted propositions (such as “man is a rational animal”) and principles 
of inference that can be absolutely valid (such as “what the definition is 
said of, the definiendum is said of as well”) or defeasible and commonly 
shared (such as “what experts say within their field of expertise should be 
considered as true”). Argumentation schemes represent the formaliza-
tion of the most commonly used principles of argumentative inferences, 
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combining material links (relations between concepts) with different types 
of reasoning, or, as Aristotle put it, “species of dialectical arguments,” such 
as induction and deduction(Topics 150a11). This representation of natural 
arguments is extremely useful for both producing and analyzing arguments, 
as it provides criteria for constructing arguments and counterarguments 
and assessing their strength. For these reasons, the interest in the practi-
cal applications of argumentation schemes is growing in different fields, 
including education, law, and computing. Schemes can be used as instru-
ments of textual analysis, allowing one to reconstruct the structure of an 
argumentative text (which can be a legal document, a medical conversation, 
or a political speech), and evaluate the reasonableness and the force of the 
arguments used. The use of the schemes crucially depends on the principles 
used to differentiate them, which in turn constitute the criteria for choos-
ing them.
Schemes and Their Implementation
Schemes are increasingly being recognized, applied and studied in 
 computational domains like artificial intelligence and multiagent systems, 
and are being used to improve the reasoning capabilities of artificial agents. 
Schemes are being incorporated into software tools for argument  mapping, 
such as Araucaria and Carneades.2 A technology for argument mining 
of legal texts drawing on a corpus of legal arguments from texts of the 
European Court of Human Rights has opened opportunities for applying 
artificial intelligence to text mining in a way that could be used to identify 
and collect arguments of known types, like argument from expert opinion.3 
The practical usefulness of an automated tool that could search through 
legal databases and pick out all the arguments of a certain type is not hard 
to imagine. Such a tool could be enhanced by argument visualization tools 
(Reed, Walton, and Macagno 2007) that could be applied to argumenta-
tive texts, yielding analyses of arguments that would display schemes in the 
structure.
In education the interest in argumentation and the patterns for rep-
resenting natural arguments is growing.4 The argumentation schemes 
illustrated in Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning (Walton 
1996) and Argumentation Schemes (Walton, Reed, and Macagno 2008) 
have been applied to science education in an effort to improve the qual-
ity of students’ arguments, retrieve the implicit premises of those argu-
ments, and assess and rebut their reasoning in a systematic fashion.5 
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However, a crucial problem arising out of the use of schemes in education 
is their  differentiation.6 Students often fail to understand the differences 
between various types of arguments, and recent developments in education 
tend to conflate the schemes instead of providing criteria for classifying or 
distinguishing between them (Kim, Anthony, and Blades 2012).
It appears from the current implementations of these theoretical 
instruments that one of the crucial issues on which their future practi-
cal development depends is their classification. For all the possible future 
uses of schemes, from education to computing, from textual interpretation 
to legal analyses, clear and effective criteria for distinguishing one scheme 
from another or a class of schemes from another are needed.
Schemes and Classifications
In argumentation theory different models of argumentation schemes have 
been advanced, together with their own specific classification criteria. The 
theories of argumentation (or argument) schemes face a twofold challenge. 
On the one hand, the schemes need to represent the patterns of arguments 
that are commonly used in ordinary conversation and in different contexts 
in order to provide criteria for describing and evaluating them. For this rea-
son, schemes need to be specific enough to highlight the different grounds 
on which a conclusion can be drawn from the premises. This was the goal 
of the proposal put forward in Argumentation Schemes (Walton, Reed, and 
Macagno 2008), in which more than sixty schemes were analyzed. However, 
using a large number of schemes leads to the risk of developing a theoretical 
model that is hard to use, for both the purposes of identifying and assessing 
the structure of natural arguments and for finding and producing complete 
and strong arguments. The balance between specificity and effectiveness 
in a theory of argumentation schemes can be achieved by providing cri-
teria of classification, allowing one to identify the most adequate scheme 
by proceeding from few generic classes to the most specific ones, until the 
pattern is identified. Three theories are particularly relevant for understand-
ing the principles that have been applied for distinguishing and classifying 
arguments in categories: Arthur Hastings’s theory, Manfred Kienpointner’s 
approach, and the pragma-dialectical account.
Hastings improves Toulmin’s argumentation model by distinguishing 
different types of warrants and grouping them in three categories based on 
the material link between premises and conclusion. The first class includes 
reasoning based on verbal and semantic relations, the second one schemes 
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grounded on causal connections, and the third one arguments that support 
either verbal or causal conclusions. Hastings’s classification (1963, 139) is 
given in table 1.
Kienpointner in Alltagslogik provides a different method for classify-
ing his sixty context-independent argument schemes. He divides them in 
three main groups according to their relation with a rule or generalization 
(endoxon). Argument schemes may be based on rules taken for granted, 
they may establish new rules by means of induction, or they may illustrate 
or use new rules by means of examples, analogy, or authority. Kienpointner 
then differentiates rule-based arguments based on their material relation 
(classification, comparison, opposition, or causality) and distinguishes the 
descriptive and normative variants and the distinct logical forms of all 
schemes (modus ponens, modus tollens, disjunctive syllogism, etc.). The 
classification is represented in table 2 (Kienpointner 1992, 246).
It can be seen that in this classification the schemes are first distin-
guished according to an extremely generic principle (inductive vs. deduc-
tive or other types of reasoning) and that then such categories are specified 
further in terms of material relations.
The pragma-dialectical system of classification of schemes is based on 
three main types (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 94–102).7 The first 
table 1. Hastings Classification of Schemes
table 2 . Kienpointner’s Classification of Schemes
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one, called “symptomatic argumentation,” represents type of argumentation 
in which the speaker tries to convince his interlocutor “by pointing out that 
something is symptomatic of something else,” meaning that what is stated 
in the argument is concomitant with what is stated in the standpoint, as 
the former is a sign or symptom of the latter. The second scheme is based 
on similarities, on an analogy between what is stated in the argument and 
what is stated in the standpoint. Finally, the third type of argumentation 
scheme is the instrumental one, in which the argument and the conclusion 
are linked by a relation of causality. No formal model or necessary condi-
tions of the notion of causality is offered to support the account given of 
the structure of this scheme. For this reason, the scope of its applicability 
to cases appears to be quite broad, depending on what notion of causality 
is intended. These three schemes are the generic categories under which 
other arguments are classified (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 97). 
For instance, arguments based on inherent qualities or a characteristic part 
of an entity or from authority are regarded as belonging to the relations 
of concomitance (symptomatic), while arguments pointing out the conse-
quences of an action or based on the means-end relationship are consid-
ered as subclasses of causal arguments. The classification criteria for these 
schemes correspond to the ways the standpoint is defended and to the criti-
cal questions associated with each argument pattern (Garssen 2001, 91). For 
instance, in symptomatic argumentation the premise points out a charac-
teristic of what is mentioned in the standpoint that is presented as typical 
thereof. In analogical arguments the similarities between what is already 
accepted (expressed in the premises) and what is potentially controversial 
(what is stated in the conclusion) are brought to light. In causal argumenta-
tion an event mentioned in the premise is presented as the cause of what 
is mentioned in the standpoint. This system of classification is grounded 
on three categories that represent respectively a material relation (causal 
arguments), a specific type of reasoning (analogy), and a class of arguments, 
symptomatic arguments, which includes mostly abductive arguments but 
also other patterns based on effect-cause or concomitance relations.
These various classification systems are based on distinct criteria and 
lay out different categories of schemes. One of the crucial characteristics of 
argumentation schemes that these models of classification identify is the 
distinction between material relations (classification, causality) and types 
of reasoning (induction, abduction). In the following sections we analyze 
in detail these two levels characterizing the schemes, which can be taken 
into consideration in order to elaborate new criteria for dividing up the 
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argumentation patterns. The goal is to propose a model aimed at meeting 
both the needs of specificity and effectiveness. In particular, this ideal model 
would be based on dichotomies. In this fashion the analyst could both 
reason from similarities (comparing the existing argument with patterns 
of arguments) and from alternatives (by excluding the most inadequate 
choice). Moreover, for the purpose of finding and producing arguments, a 
system of classification needs to proceed from the speaker’s communicative 
intentions, which can be further specified by taking into account the means 
to achieve them.
types of argument and types of reasoning
In the dialectical tradition, general topics represent abstract patterns of 
inference based on the semantical-ontological structure of language (such 
as loci from definition, opposition, etc.) and the structure of reality (causes 
and consequences). Cicero, however, distinguishes some loci in this category 
that, on his view, are principally used by dialecticians. Such topics, named 
loci from antecedents, consequents, and incompatibles, represent patterns of 
reasoning based only on the meaning of the connector of the hypothetical 
premise (if . . . then). For instance, if such a premise holds and the anteced-
ent is affirmed, the consequent follows necessarily (topic from antecedents) 
(Cicero, Topica 53:1–25). These loci seem to be aimed at establishing com-
mitments based on past commitments. In other words, instead of increasing 
the audience’s acceptability of a viewpoint based on the presumed accept-
ability of the content of the premises in a rhetorical situation, such topics 
elicit the opponent’s acceptance of a conclusion in a dialectical setting. They 
can be regarded as rules of commitment. In the twelfth century, the notion 
of forms of inference was developed into a reduction of all topical infer-
ences to syllogisms. In the thirteenth century, categorical syllogisms were 
analyzed as proceeding from topics from the whole to the part, called dici 
de omni and dici de nullo. These topics were grounded not in the meaning 
of the propositions, but only on the quantifiers: every A is B; every B is C; 
therefore, every A is C (Green-Pedersen 1984, 256).
This ancient treatment of the topics and the so-called consequences 
can shed some light on the relation between natural arguments, classes of 
generic maxim propositions (loci), and formal patterns of argument. Formal 
patterns of argument are characterized by a very abstract ontology, which 
takes into account only the meaning of few expressions such as quantifiers 
or connectors. The maxims, on the other hand, are grounded on a much richer 
ontology, which takes into account a wide range of commonly accepted 
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connections between concepts and events, such as causal or  definitional 
relations. These classifications and formalizations can be regarded as lev-
els of abstraction, gathering under more generic principles different but 
somehow similar arguments, which can be necessarily or defeasibly valid. 
In particular, the rules governing the different types of syllogism (such as 
modus ponens) constitute the highest level of abstraction. Searle puts it 
very clearly (2001, 19):
It would be more accurate to say that the rule of modus ponens 
gets its validity from the fact that it expresses a pattern of an infi-
nite number of inferences that are independently valid. The actual 
argument does not get its validity from any external source: if it 
is valid, it can be valid only because the premises entail the con-
clusion. Because the meanings of the words themselves are suf-
ficient to guarantee the validity of the inference, we can formalize 
a pattern that describes an infinite number of such inferences. But 
the inference does not derive its validity from the pattern. The 
 so-called rule of modus ponens is just a statement of a pattern of an 
infinite number of such independently valid inferences.
However, if we analyze the structure of many arguments that are normally 
considered to be acceptable and reasonable, we will see that abstract rules 
different from the ones of deduction apply (Blair 2007). Reasoning from 
example or from sign, for instance, cannot be analyzed using deductive 
rules of inference such as modus ponens or modus tollens (Godden 2005).
The first hint of the possibility of having different high-level types of 
argument pattern can be found in Aristotle. In the Rhetoric (1357b12–23), he 
distinguishes between argument from example and enthymeme, showing a 
correspondence between the former and induction and between the latter 
and deduction. Moreover, he underscores a crucial difference in reasoning 
from signs, differentiating between proper (or infallible) signs and improper 
(or defeasible) ones. Aristotle advocates the view that that only proper signs 
can be put in a syllogistic form, while examples need to be analyzed as forms 
of induction, and an improper sign cannot be traced back to either type of 
reasoning. It represents a form of reasoning called by Peirce “abduction,” 
indicating a type of reasoning stemming from a major premise, which we 
can represent as p →→ q, and a minor premise q, which represents the conse-
quent of the conditional. It is a kind of syllogism in which the conclusion 
and the minor premise are switched, which is also called retroduction or rea-
soning from best explanation.8 Building on the Aristotelian account, we can 
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distinguish the level of the type of argument, that is, a common  pattern of 
premises supporting a conclusion based on a specific semantic (or topical 
or material) relation (that we call abstraction 1), from the level of the type of 
reasoning, or rather the kinds of “logical” reasoning and their axioms (which 
we call abstraction 2). We represent the two levels of abstraction of the topics 
in table 3.
This classification, however, can cause several problems. The Latin and 
medieval account of loci is not focused on the relationship between the first 
and the second level of abstraction but only on the characteristics of classes 
of argument distinguished by some generic common features. Modern 
theories of argumentation schemes inherited this combination of levels of 
abstraction in defining the types of argument. While this criterion can be 
extremely helpful for rapidly identifying common characteristics in argu-
ments that are frequently used, it can lead to problems when it comes to 
classifying the schemes or evaluating them. In order to contribute to the 
classification process, in the following sections we try to show how the rela-
tions between the two levels of abstraction are extremely complex and how 
they relate to each other.
imperfect bridges
The distinction between the two levels of abstraction can be helpful for 
understanding the structure of argumentation schemes. As we have noted, 
argumentation schemes can be considered representations of common 
inferences, providing an abstract pattern that shows the material (or seman-
tic) link between the concepts used in the premise and the conclusion and 
the prototypical (most common) rule of reasoning on which the inference 
is based. Consider for instance, the following scheme, the argument from 
cause to effect (Walton, Reed, and Macagno 2008, 168):
table 3. Types of Argument and Types of Reasoning
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This scheme proceeds from a generic relation (more specifically a causal 
one) between two events. This argument structure, as it is presented, can be 
classified at a second level of abstraction as defeasibly deductive and in 
particular as a scheme based on defeasible modus ponens. On this view, the 
semantic (topical), first-level relation is combined with a specific logical, 
second-level one. However, not only do argumentation schemes provide 
a generic major premise (the maxima propositio, or topic) from which a 
conclusion can be drawn, but they specify the (second-level) rule represent-
ing the passage from the premises to the conclusion. The aforementioned 
combination between the first and the second level of abstraction can only 
mirror one of the possible ways in which the conclusion is drawn from the 
major premise. The actual relationship is much more complex.
For instance, different arguments based on the classic Aristotelian 
causal link between “having fever” and “breathing fast” can be found:
1. He had fever. (Fever causes breathing fast). Therefore, he (must 
have) breathed fast.
2. He did not breathe fast. (Fever causes breathing fast). Therefore, he 
had no fever.
3. He is breathing fast. (Only fever causes breathing fast). Therefore, he 
has fever.
4. He is breathing fast. (Fever causes breathing fast). Therefore, he 
might have fever.
5. He has no fever. (Fever causes breathing fast). Therefore, he may be 
not breathing fast.
These cases illustrate five different ways to draw a conclusion from a causal 
principle, or rather causal major premise in a scheme. In (1) the rule of defea-
sible modus ponens applies, while in (2) the logical pattern is the defeasible 
modus tollens. In (3) the causal principle is different, as the sufficient and the 
necessary conditions are inverted; for this reason the affirmation of the conse-
quent can be reconstructed as a modus ponens. In (4), however, the conclusion 
table 4 . Argumentation Scheme 1
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is drawn from the same causal principle by  affirming the  consequent. This type 
of reasoning, which leads to the possibility that the state of affairs represented 
in the conclusion may be true, is commonly referred to as abductive (or retro-
ductive) reasoning (Peirce 1992, 140–41). The last argument (5) can be rephrased 
by contraposition as “Not breathing fast is caused by having no fever,” and the 
conclusion would follow abductively (it would be a kind of negative abduction).
There are types of argument in which the semantic (material) relation is 
left implicit, and it does not need to be reconstructed in order to provide the 
complete logical structure of the argument. While in the arguments we have 
just considered the major premise is simply tacit, in inductive and analogical 
reasoning it is implicit, as it is reconstructed a posteriori. In the first case, the 
maxim proposition (or the causal principle in this case) can be drawn by exam-
ple, or rather by an operation inductive in nature (the Aristotelian reasoning 
from example; see Rhetoric 1357a14–16). For instance, it is possible to reason as 
follows: “You may have fever. When I had fever, I was breathing fast, and you 
are breathing fast.” Here the causal principle is implicit, inductively abstracted 
from the specific past case and then applied to the case at issue. Similarly, the 
same causal maxim can also be implicit in analogical reasoning, which can 
be considered as a form of reasoning, distinct from induction and deduction, 
consisting in abstracting a generic category or relation from two similar cases.9 
An example of an analogy-based causal argument would be “You may have 
fever. When cows have fever, they breathe fast, and you are breathing fast.” In 
this argument, the semantic causal relation is drawn analogically from two 
similar cases (the fast breathing of cows and human beings).
Other crucial argumentation schemes can be analyzed according to 
the distinction between the semantical-ontological ground and the type of 
reasoning. For instance, a similar analysis can also be applied to schemes 
grounded on the material relation (which can be considered from cause) 
between the quality of the source (expertise or authority) and the quality 
of his or her statement (acceptability). A different, more complex analysis 
needs to be made for the argument from verbal classification, which has 
been represented as follows (Walton, Reed, and Macagno 2008, 319):
table 5. Argumentation Scheme 2
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Classification broadly understood as the use of a particular word to 
denote a fragment of reality (Walton and Macagno 2010) can be based 
on different definitional or quasidefinitional material relations, which hide 
deeper forms of reasoning. The convertibility of the definiens and definien-
dum is a semantic (or rather metasemantic) relation, and for this reason it 
depends on the nature of the specific definition. Victorinus in his Liber de 
definitionibus listed several types of different definitions, of which the most 
important ones are the essential definition, the definition by parts, etymol-
ogy, description, illustration, and metaphor. Some of these definitions (by 
genus difference, essential property, or etymology) establish a two-way 
relationship, while others (such as definition by parts) only a univocal one 
(Macagno and Walton 2014, chap. 3). Metaphorical definitions express an 
analogy between two different entities (Macagno and Walton 2009, 173), 
while definitions by illustration provide an example from which it is pos-
sible to attribute the classification inductively.
Some argumentation schemes do not feature only one step of reasoning 
but instead involve a chain of argumentation and for this reason are complex. 
The most representative category of complex schemes is that for the argu-
ment from consequences (if a state of affairs is good/bad, it should/should 
not be brought about), which is based on the relationship between classifica-
tion of an entity as good or bad according to some values (argument from 
classification) and the relationship between value judgment and action (argu-
ment from values, based on the premise that if a value V is good/bad, the 
agent is committed to goal G).10 Emotional arguments are variants of this 
complex pattern, where an emotion (fear or pity, or rather compassion) sup-
ports an argumentative passage from evaluation to commitment.
Analysis of the most common pattern of arguments shows how argu-
ments can be grounded on different types of topical relations and can be 
characterized by different logical patterns. Argumentation schemes are 
imperfect abstractions, possible bridges between the first and the second 
level of abstraction. The two levels do not match, as conclusions can be 
drawn deductively, abductively, inductively, or analogically from the same 
semantic link. Argumentation schemes provide the generic and abstract 
pattern of the prototypical causal or classificatory, inductive, or analogical 
arguments, without considering that arguments from classification can 
proceed abductively, and reasoning from example can be used to classify 
an entity or support the reliability of a claim based on its source’s expertise. 
There can be various combinations between semantic relations, types of rea-
soning, and rules of inference (such as modus ponens, modus tollens, posi-
tive and negative abduction), which are not accounted for by an approach 
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aimed at classifying schemes according to either purely semantic or logical 
criteria. By drawing the distinction between the two levels of abstraction, 
it is possible to analyze them separately and classify the schemes showing 
the possible interrelations between the semantic relations and logical rules.
classifying the schemes
Argumentation schemes can be characterized by various semantic (or 
 topical) relations, and the conclusion can follow from the premises in virtue 
of distinct types of reasoning (abductive, deductive, inductive) and logical 
rules of inference. The combinations between these levels result in a vari-
ety of possible schemes similar in content or logical form. Moreover, some 
schemes are characterized by a structure involving the combination of two 
or more schemes. How should we classify this variety of argument pat-
terns? As we have suggested, a system of classification based on dichoto-
mies could be extremely effective, especially in cases of uncertainty. The 
crucial problem is to identify the criteria that can be used to articulate the 
schemes in alternatives.
A classification based on the semantic link can provide an instrument 
for understanding why the premise can support the conclusion. However, 
the semantic link can be the same for arguments aimed at different types 
of conclusions or the same type of conclusion can be supported by dif-
ferent semantic relations. For instance, causal relations can constitute the 
core of practical arguments, and at the same time arguments from sign 
(and not only the ones based on definition) can be aimed at classifying an 
entity. A classification based uniquely on the semantic content would blur 
these fundamental differences. For this reason the ontological (semantic) 
criterion needs to be integrated within a more generic pattern, which we 
call end-means, that is, a system based on the purpose of an argumentative 
move and the possible means that are or can be used to achieve it.
Argumentation Schemes and Argument Purposes
Schemes can be considered instruments for both interpreting a dialogical 
move and the reasoning underlying it, as well as for building arguments and 
discourse moves. For this reason, a system of classification that starts from 
the communicative purpose of an argument could be extremely effective 
for bringing to light the most basic distinctions. From the point of view of 
the reconstruction and interpretation of a move, the analysis of an inference 
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presupposes a previous understanding of both the structure of the scheme 
and the purpose (and, therefore, the “pragmatic” meaning) of the argument 
and the components thereof.11 For example, an argument can be aimed at 
classifying a state of affairs, support the existence of a state of affairs, pro-
vide reasons in favor of a value judgment, or influence a decision-making 
process.
This generic principle can be used for drawing a first distinction 
between the types of argumentation schemes. The purpose of an argumen-
tation move limits and defines the possible types of argument that can 
be used to achieve it. As a matter of fact, not all the semantic (material) 
relations that are at the basis of the schemes can support all the possible 
conclusions or purposes of an argument. For instance, definitional schemes 
are aimed at supporting the classification of an entity or state of affairs, and 
for this reason they are unlikely to lead to the prediction or retrodiction 
of an event. Similarly, reasoning from consequences can be used to estab-
lish the desirability of a course of action but cannot lead reasonably to the 
truth or falsity (or acceptability) of a proposition. On this perspective, the 
analysis of the pragmatic meaning of an argument provides a criterion for 
restricting the possible choices. However, the idea of argument purpose is 
ambiguous, as it can refer to the goal of the discourse move to be analyzed 
(the “meaning” of one’s speech act) or the goal that the speaker wants to 
achieve by means of an argument. If we adopt the view of the speaker as a 
producer of arguments, we need to find the possible alternatives the speaker 
can choose between in order to achieve his or her goal. For this reason, 
the generic communicative purpose can place before the speaker different 
means to achieve it. The criterion of classification thus becomes an inter-
relation between the pragmatic goal of an argument and the means used.
The second differentiation concerns the strategies directly connected 
with the purpose of the move. As mentioned before, the first distinction is a 
pragmatic one, which depends on most generic nature of the subject matter, 
that is, a course of action or a state of affairs. This alternative leads to a first 
choice of the instruments that the speaker can avail himself of.
When the goal is to establish the desirability of performing a certain 
action, the speaker can support his or her conclusion internally by evalu-
ating its consequences or the means to achieve a certain goal. In the first 
case, a course of action can be judged as desirable or undesirable because of 
the positive or negative effects that can result from it. In the second case, 
the reasoning proceeds from the goal to the possible productive or neces-
sary means to bring it about (Von Wright 1963, 161). The external patterns 
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of argument can support courses of action in two ways. On the one hand, 
the authority can correspond to the (social) role of the source needed for 
recommending or imposing a choice (“You shall do it because I told you 
to!”). On the other hand, a course of action can be pursued based on popu-
lar practice (“We should buy a bigger car. Everyone drives big cars here!”).
When the purpose is to support a judgment on a state of affairs, the 
speaker is also faced with the same alternative, that is, the choice between 
external and internal arguments. In the first case, unlike with arguments 
used to make a decision, the relevant quality of the source is not the author-
ity of the speaker or of a group of people (which is connected with the 
consequences of not complying with orders/conforming to common behav-
ioral expectations) but their superior knowledge. This group of arguments 
includes schemes from expert opinion, popular opinion, and the position to 
know. The quality of the source can be also used for “destructive” purposes 
to undercut an argument (ad hominem arguments) and show that a source 
is not reliable for information, and therefore the conclusion itself should be 
considered doubtful. The arguments used to provide internal grounds for 
a judgment on a state of affairs can be divided according to the nature of 
the predicate that is to be attributed. The most basic differentiation can be 
traced between the arguments used (1) to support a (factual or evaluative) 
judgment on an entity or a state of affairs or (2) to establish the existence of 
a state of affairs (the occurrence of an event or the existence of an entity in 
the present, past, or future).
In (1), the reasoning can be divided in two types. On the one hand, 
reasoning from classification can be grounded on descriptive (definitional) 
features, which support the attribution of a categorization (Bob is a man; 
Tom is a cat). On the other hand, an entity or a state of affairs can be evalu-
ated, namely, a value judgment is attributed. This type of classification is 
grounded on values, or rather hierarchies of values, and depends not on 
a shared definition of a concept but rather on what is commonly consid-
ered to be “good” or “bad.” Also the reasoning underlying the attribution of 
evaluative predicates, such as “to be a criminal,” can be considered as part 
of this group of arguments. These patterns are based on signs of an internal 
disposition of character, which in its turn is evaluated. Therefore, this group 
of classificatory and evaluative arguments includes the schemes from verbal 
classification, from sign, from composition, and from division.
In (2), the arguments supporting a prediction or a retrodiction can be 
used either to establish whether a fact or event has occurred, or to predict 
whether it will occur. When the event is a future one, the speaker needs to 
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mostly rely on possible cause-effect relations; in knowing certain causes, he 
or she may draw from them the most likely effects. The reasoning will be 
different when the speaker intends to support a judgment as to the exis-
tence of an entity or the occurrence of an event in the past (retrodiction). 
He or she will reason from the possible signs, that is, he or she will take into 
account the possible effects of an event or the existence of an entity and 
reconstruct the possible efficient or material causes thereof. The distinctions 
we have outlined can be summarized in the tree represented in figure 1.
In this classification, schemes are grouped according to the interplay 
between two criteria, the purpose of an argument and the means of achiev-
ing it. This model can be used both for analyzing arguments and for pro-
ducing them. In the first case, the tree represents the possible intentions of 
the speaker, that is, the communicative goal that his or her move is aimed 
at accomplishing. The interpretation of his or her intentions starts from the 
most generic purpose, to make a decision or to advance a judgment on a 
state of affairs. The possible interpretations are then made more specific, so 
that the analyst can reconstruct the possible communicative goal by reason-
ing from alternatives and retrieve the possible argumentation scheme used. 
In the second case, this system of classification provides alternative strate-
gies, from the more generic to the more specific ones, to achieve a specific 
communicative purpose. Here the nature of the viewpoint opens up specific 
argumentative means to support it, which in turn can be determined by the 
characteristics of the conclusion.
The pragmatic purpose of an argumentative move is strictly bound 
to the ontological structure of the subject matter of the claim. In other 
words, the communicative purpose and the strategies used (or to be used) 
to achieve it can be partially identified by taking into consideration the 
nature of the viewpoint. The speaker or the analyst can choose the scheme 
according to the generic goal of the communicative act (to support a deci-
sion or to ground a judgment concerning a state of affairs). The speaker’s 
communicative intention can be then further specified by detailing the 
most generic strategy chosen to provide a basis for the acceptability of the 
conclusion, whether by pointing out some properties of the subject matter 
or by appealing to an external source. In the first case, the means used to 
achieve the goal are again determined by the nature of the subject matter. In 
particular, the crucial distinction is between the classification and the pre-
diction  (retrodiction) of an entity or state of affairs. This distinction leads 
to a further specification of the nature of the viewpoint that the speaker 
intends to back with his argument (is the event a future or a past one? is the 
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classification a value judgment or does it consist in the attribution of factual 
properties?), which in turn leads to the specific means that can be used to 
achieve his or her purpose. In case of decision making, the argumentation 
schemes are classified according to the same interrelation between the goal 
and the generic strategies to achieve them. Within the internal arguments, 
it is possible to distinguish between the decision to support a course of 
action by taking into account is consequences or the means to achieve it. 
External arguments are characterized by a lower complexity of the inter-
relation between the purpose and the means used to achieve it. In this 
case, the choice of backing the conclusion by appealing to the opinion of a 
source can be made more specific by distinguishing between the kinds of 
sources (experts or the majority of people) and the nature of the support 
(knowledge or reliability). These generic categories of schemes can serve to 
group the various argumentation schemes that a speaker might use to back 
a conclusion or that an analyst might draw on to reconstruct the speaker’s 
intention.
As we have noted, argumentation schemes are imperfect and provide 
complex bridges between topical relations and logical rules of inference. 
A more complete picture of these distinctions needs to take into account 
how argumentation schemes are placed within the matrix between seman-
tic and logical relations. To this purpose, the two levels of abstraction need 
to be further specified and analyzed.
The semantic relation characterizing a scheme can be “shaped” accord-
ing to different types of reasoning (understood as the categories belonging 
to the second level of abstraction). For instance, the desirability of a course 
of action can be assessed internally by taking into consideration the means 
for achieving a goal. However, this pattern of reasoning can be stronger 
or weaker depending on whether there is only one or several alternatives. 
Depending on the paradigm of the possible means, the reasoning will be 
deductive or abductive, resulting in a conclusion less or more defeasible. 
The same principle applies to the other semantic relations, such as causal 
relations or classification, which can proceed by induction, deduction, 
abduction, or analogy.
For instance, the desirability of a course of action can be established by 
considering the consequences or the means to a goal. In the first case, the rea-
soning will proceed from the intended positive effect to its productive cause 
(abduction) or from the undesired effect to the negation of its cause (modus 
tollens). If the purpose is to assess the means to achieve a goal, the speaker 
will reason abductively from the effect to the means or deductively in case the 
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cause is also necessary. External arguments in this case proceed deductively, 
from an order or a common practice to the action. The acceptability of a judg-
ment on a future action can be supported by a causal relation proceeding 
deductively, inductively (x happened in the past, therefore it can happen in the 
future), or analogically (x happened in a similar situation before). Judgments 
on the occurrence of past events can backed up by similar deductive, ana-
logical, and inductive (from similar past events) reasoning. The attribution 
of causal properties and value judgments can be grounded on different types 
of definition or definitional premises, which can lead to different types of 
reasoning, as we have mentioned. Last, arguments based on a knowledgeable 
source can proceed deductively (if an expert says that x is true, x is true; expert 
x says that x is true; therefore x is true), inductively (what x said in the past 
was true, so what he says now is true as well), abductively (x said that p was 
true, and it was true; therefore, he is an expert) or analogically (this medicine 
student was right when gave his opinion on my broken bone; therefore, this 
engineering student is right when he says that the bridge will collapse soon). 
The arguments aimed at undermining an argument from sources (ad homi-
nem arguments) or aimed at supporting the unacceptability of a judgment 
based on the quality of the source combine defeasibly deductive patterns (x is 
unreliable; therefore he will not tell the truth) with abductive ones (x behaved 
badly, therefore he should not be trusted). In figure 2 we represent how the 
different semantic relations can be shaped differently according to the distinct 
types of reasoning.
This classification of schemes shows a strict interdependence between 
the ontological-semantic structure of the standpoint, the possible argu-
ments that can be used, and the types of reasoning. The analysis of the 
possible kinds of definitional propositions illustrates how, depending on 
the nature of the definition or classificatory premise used, the types of rea-
soning are different. This relationship is also crucial for causal arguments, or 
rather arguments that are grounded on a distinct species of causes. By ana-
lyzing in detail the semantic link, such as the types of causes, it is possible to 
better assess the reasonableness of an argument, or rather how it is possible 
for a given premise to support a conclusion. For instance, by determin-
ing the type of causal relations between action and character and character 
and action it is possible to assess the strength of a value judgment and its 
defeasibility conditions. In the first case, it is necessary to consider the goal 
and the occurrences of specific good or bad actions in order to establish 
the final cause of the agent (which determines his or her disposition to act, 
or rather character), while in the second case the habit efficiently influences 
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the agent’s future actions.12 This type of analysis can be carried out on the 
semantic relations on which the predication and retrodiction of events is 
based. On the one hand, predictions can be made by taking into account 
causal laws or weaker and defeasible causal generalizations. For instance, 
a future event can be predicted because its efficient cause has occurred, 
such as in case of earthquakes. In other cases, such as weather forecasts, 
the material cause (the presence of clouds) is fundamental. Actions can be 
predicted also based on the intention of the agent, such as with diplomatic 
decisions. Clearly causal laws are not the only means we use for draw-
ing predictions on future events. Speakers also draw on weaker forms of 
relations between events, that is, co-occurrences and “mechanisms” (Elster 
1999, chap. 1), which we group under the label of “causal generalizations” 
that frequently occur. Such relations are only possible explanations of what 
frequently happens and cannot be considered as causal laws. For instance, 
we expect a supermarket to be open at a certain hour because it was open 
at that time previously in the past; we expect an aggressive behavior from 
a wounded or scared animal, even though other possible responses may be 
triggered by the same circumstance. On the other hand, the same causal 
laws and generalizations can support the reconstruction of past events. 
Evidence of a past event or entity can be found in its effects, which were 
caused efficiently, materially or teleologically, or in the results of mecha-
nisms and co-occurrences. In figure 3 we represent the possible structure 
of one of the distinctions set out in the figures 1 and 2. The semantic link is 
analyzed according to the types of causes or relations.
fig. 3. Semantic Relations and Argument Purposes
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To summarize the classificatory system we have proposed, we need 
to distinguish between the levels of abstraction and the principle of clas-
sification. The criterion used to dichotomously organize the argument pat-
terns is based on the communicative goal of an argument and the possible 
strategies for achieving it. From an analytical perspective, this end-means 
structure corresponds to the specification of the communicative intention 
of the speaker, and for this reason it can be considered a detailed analy-
sis of the argument’s purpose or its pragmatic meaning. This classificatory 
criterion is purely communicative (even though it is essentially related to 
the ontological structure of the conclusion and the premises) and does not 
overlap with the two levels of abstraction, which are focused on the formal 
structure and the ontological nature of the arguments. The tree of argument 
purposes can therefore be further analyzed according to the two levels of 
abstraction, representing the strength of an argument, or rather the logical 
connection between premises and conclusion (level of abstraction 2), and its 
reasonableness, or rather the acceptability of the material relation between 
premises and conclusion (level of abstraction 1). Generic argument pur-
poses organize the schemes, which in their turn can be examined according 
to distinct material links (definition, cause, co-occurrence, and so forth) and 
the different rules of reasoning.
Argumentation Schemes and Argument Reconstruction
As we have noted, the proposed criterion of classification can be used for 
both producing and analyzing arguments. In particular, in the case of analy-
sis, the classification system represents a specification of the communicative 
purpose of the argument, which can be used as an instrument for restrict-
ing its possible interpretations. On this perspective, a discourse move can 
be interpreted starting from its most generic goal, namely, whether it is 
aimed at making a decision or supporting a judgment on a state of affairs. 
By selecting the alternative means that can be used to achieve the general 
goal, the possible interpretations of the move are narrowed down until a 
specific scheme is selected. In this way, the system of classification permits 
the reconstruction of the specific pragmatic meaning of the move.
The relationship between the purpose of a move, the means used 
to achieve it, and the interpretation becomes clear if we reconstruct the 
reasoning underlying the retrieval of the implicit premises in an argu-
ment. In order to retrieve what is left unsaid in an argument, it is neces-
sary to understand its communicative goal and, more precisely, the specific 
PR 48.1_02_Macagno-Walton.indd   47 28/01/15   6:57 AM
fabrizio macagno and douglas walton
48
communicative intention of the speaker, which includes both the effect that 
he or she wants to achieve on the dialogical situation (alter particular com-
mitments of the parties) and instruments that he or she uses to achieve this 
goal. Consider the following arguments:
1. (A) Our operations do not involve the presence of U.S. ground 
troops. (B) Our operations are not “hostilities.”
2. (A) Bob is violent. (B) He punched his brother.
In these cases, the connectors between the two sequences in both examples 
express a relation of “motivation” (sequence x expresses a reason to believe 
sequence y) (Rigotti and Rocci 2006).13 This relation can be represented by 
the linguistic connective “therefore” in (1), and “as” in (2), depending on the 
order between the motivated and the motivating state of affairs. In (1) the 
purpose of the first sequence (A) is to support the attribution of the predicate 
“to be hostilities” to “our operations,” which corresponds to the goal of deter-
mining the acceptability of a proposition. For this reason, the purpose can be 
presumed to be the classification of a state of affairs. Moreover, (A) supports 
such a classification by describing the characteristics of the subject of the 
predication (“our operations”). The purpose of the first sequence can thus be 
said to provide an internal justification, which in this case is based on a defi-
nitional (or more generically classificatory) principle aimed at the attribution 
of the predicate “to be hostilities” in the second sequence (Kempson 1975, 
109–10). Based on the purpose of the conclusion and the premise (A and B), 
it is possible to reconstruct the material link and retrieve the pattern of argu-
ment. We can represent the structure of the argument as shown in figure 4.
The purpose of the conclusion indicates the function of the relation 
between the two sequences, which is further specified by replacing the 
variables with the information provided in the first sequence. Similarly, 
in  (2) the purpose of the conclusion (A) is to attribute a quality to the 
subject. However, in this case the second sequence, motivating the first one, 
describes a particular action carried out by the subject. For this reason, the 
specific relation is a sign: (B) provides a possible effect of a stable disposi-
tion indicated in (A).
This linguistic and pragmatic account of the purpose (or pragmatic 
meaning) of a speech act (or dialogue move) allows one to link the patterns 
of reasoning to their communicative dimension. In this perspective, the 
meaning of a move corresponds to the purpose of the argument. In turn, 
the goal of the argument can be used as an instrument for understanding 
the structure of the argument itself and consequently for reconstructing its 
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implicit components. For this reason, a classification based on the function 
of a type of argument is useful for both recognizing the schemes and iden-
tifying their patterns. The different categories of conclusions (established 
according to their generic purpose) are supported by different semantic 
relations (causal, classification, and so on), and this connection needs to be 
framed by different logical patterns (defeasible modus ponens, abductive 
processes, induction, etc.).
conclusion
Argumentation schemes can be regarded as the modern development of an 
ancient idea. They are the result of a combination of two levels of abstrac-
tion, two different ways of looking at the complex reality of natural argu-
ments. Semantic, or topical, relations represent a criterion for classifying 
the arguments based on the content of their major premise. The types of 
reasoning take into consideration the form of the argument, how a premise 
fig. 4 . Purpose and Argument Structure
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can support a conclusion based on the relation between the antecedent 
and consequent, or the quantification of the predicates in the premises and 
conclusion. These two levels do not overlap, but the possible combinations 
between them are extremely complex. This general framework raises a cru-
cial question: is it possible to identify a criterion for organizing this complex 
matrix of semantic and logical connections? Providing an instrument that 
combines the two levels in a coherent way would make the identification 
of common structures of reasoning easier and would allow one to evaluate 
natural arguments based on the rules of the two levels of abstraction.
A possible answer can be found starting from the idea of what an argu-
mentation scheme is. Within the conceptual frame of levels of abstraction, 
argumentation schemes can be thought of as imperfect bridges between 
different conceptual levels. They are forms of abstraction, yet the ground 
from which they abstract is not made of the possible arguments but of the 
most fundamental ones for everyday conversational argumentation. For this 
reason, they mirror prototypical ways of reasoning, and this simplification 
in the object of inquiry makes them at the same time incomplete abstrac-
tions yet extremely useful and effective instruments. How can we combine 
the effectiveness of prototypes with the specificity and complexity of the 
combinations between material and logical relations? One possibility is to 
find a way of organizing them that transcends both levels of abstraction and 
of representing not what an argument is but why it is used and how it can 
be understood and interpreted. In this fashion, a classification system can 
mirror the actual practices of using and reconstructing arguments.
The most generic principle of the classification we have proposed is the 
purpose of a dialogical move. The fundamental dialogical characteristic of 
arguments is that they are acts used for a communicative goal, which can be 
further made more specific by taking into account the possible argumenta-
tive strategies that can be used to achieve it. Thus the dialogical purpose 
consisting in defending a judgment on state of affairs or the desirability of 
a course of action can be accomplished through internal or external argu-
ments, depending on the decision to take into account the subject matter or 
not. The classes of arguments that can be used, and especially the internal 
ones, are strictly related to the ontological structure of the viewpoint that is 
to be supported. Depending on whether that viewpoint represents a predic-
tion or the attribution of properties to a state of affairs, the argumentative 
instruments will be different. The ontological structure of the viewpoint 
excludes certain classes of arguments, narrowing down the possible choices.
This approach results in a tree of possible goals and means, a 
 dichotomous structure that leads the speaker or the analyst to identify the 
most suitable argumentation scheme. This tree of goals and means can be 
combined with the analysis of the semantic and logical levels of abstraction, 
which can bring to light the criteria for assessing the reasonableness and 
the strength of a specific argument.
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